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BEWARE OF WOODEN NICKELS: THE PARADOX 
OF FLORIDA’S LEGISLATIVE OVERREACTION IN 
THE WAKE OF KELO 
Ann Marie Cavazos* 
This article addresses Florida’s reaction to the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London.  In Kelo, the Court provided 
a more expansive view of “the public use” of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause to include taking property from one private owner and transferring 
it to a corporation or non-private citizen when the transfer is deemed by 
the lawmakers to be in the public good or for a public purpose. 
Florida, together with several other states, concluded that such 
eminent domain takings, while constitutionally permissible, offend the 
states’ sense of fair play as it relates to private homeowners’ property 
rights.  Several states sought legislative solutions to ameliorate the Court’s 
decision.  The most reactive solution to date was enacted by the Florida 
legislature. 
The Florida statutory amendments cured the pernicious act of 
governmental taking of private property from one citizen and conveying it 
to another who promises to make “better use” of the property by 
specifically prohibiting it; however, this flat prohibition on economic 
development or blight condemnation eliminated a legitimate municipal tool 
serving all residents, albeit at the expense of a few affected homeowners.  
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Consequently, the amendments may have unintended side effects which are 
worse than the ill they purported to cure. 
This article also examines the negative impact of these amendments 
on counties, towns, and municipalities which have traditionally relied on 
lawful takings to modernize their urban areas, attract financing and 
industry, and increase their tax bases.  After Kelo, Florida hoped to be a 
model of legislative responsibility; however, upon further analysis, 
Florida’s reaction might prove to be premature and counterproductive. 
In short, the rush to enact laws to protect homeowners from the 
holding in Kelo has resulted in potentially more harm than intended and is 
a “Pyrrhic” victory at best. 
 
“There is surely nothing so useless as doing with great efficiency what 
should not be done at all.”
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New 
London, allowed a municipality to take property for just compensation for 
the public purpose of economic development.
2
  The 5-4 decision caused 
uproar among private property advocates nationwide.
3
  The fear that 
 
 1. PETER F. DRUCKER, CLASSIC DRUCKER: ESSENTIAL WISDOM OF PETER DRUCKER 
FROM THE PAGES OF HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 83 (Thomas A. Stewart ed., Harvard 
Business Press 2006). 
 2. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489−90 (2005) (emphasizing that the 
Court‟s authority extends only to determining whether the City‟s proposed condemnations 
are for a “public use” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution through interpretation of a century of case law).  The author of this article 
recognizes that this area of the law has many issues.  Certainly, those on the lower socio-
economic ladder are the ones most harmed by eminent domain takings.  It is not the intent of 
this article to address that aspect; rather, the focus is on restrictive legislation and its effect 
on local government.  For further discussion on the impact of eminent domain takings on the 
poor, see George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight Got to Do With 
It?, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 803 (2007-2008); Tom I. Romero, II, Kelo, Parents and 
The Spatialization of Color (Blindness) in the Berman-Brown Metropolitan Heterotopia, 
2008 UTAH L. REV. 947 (2008); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN 
CITIES (1993); Pat Beall, Riviera Beach Eminent Domain Case Draws National Spotlight, 
PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 11, 2005, 
http//www.palmbeachpost.com/localnews/content/local_news/epaper/2005/12/11/c1a_blight
_1211.html. 
 3. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 458 (holding that the city‟s condemnation of private property 
met the “public use” test of the Fifth Amendment, where the property was thereafter to be 
handed over to Pfizer for the construction of its research and development headquarters).  
Pfizer has since decided to close its research and development headquarters in New London, 
Connecticut.  The City spent $78 million bulldozing the condemned properties and failed to 
realize its initial goals of producing tax benefits and creating jobs.  Unfortunately, the land 
remains vacant.  See Editorial, Pfizer and Kelo’s Ghost Town, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at 
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money-minded municipalities would conspire with greedy developers to 
take desirable, as well as undesirable, property from individual 
homeowners and convert it to the developers‟ own profitable use was more 
than some state legislatures, and their constituents, could endure.
4
  
Lawmakers in many states rushed to pass restrictive legislation to 
ameliorate the perceived “evils” of Kelo.
5
  New legislation focused on 
narrowing the definition of “public purpose,” a key phrase in eminent 
domain law. 
This article explores the evolution of the definition of “public 
purpose” and the unintended consequences of legislative reactions to the 
Kelo decision.  Part II discusses the Kelo decision and its precedent.  Part 
III examines legislative reactions to Kelo across the nation.  Part IV offers a 
case-study focusing on Florida‟s legislative reaction, an example of a hasty 
legislative reaction which may have the unintended consequence of 
unnecessarily restricting local governments‟ ability to redevelop blighted 
communities for the public health, public safety, morals, peace, and 
welfare.
6
  Part V explores the unintended consequences of Florida‟s 
reaction to Kelo.  Part VI discusses an alternative to Florida‟s approach that 
protects individual property rights and prevents developer abuses without 
unduly restricting local governments‟ ability to improve economic 
conditions for all residents. 
II. EMINENT DOMAIN: KELO AND ITS PRECEDENT 
Eminent domain is, generally speaking, the term given to actions of a 
municipal, county, state, or federal government taking private property for 
a public use without the owner‟s consent.
7
  It is an inherent sovereign 
power of the government.
8
  The last clause of the Fifth Amendment 
provides the Constitutional basis for governmental restraint on eminent 
domain actions.
9
  More commonly referred to as the Takings Clause,
10
 the 
 
A20 (discussing the aftermath of Kelo). 
 4. Fred Lucas, Eminent Domain Outcry Pierces Statehouses, STATELINE.ORG (Mar. 16, 
2008), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=96421. 
 5. See Pfizer and Kelo’s Ghost Town, supra note 3 (reporting voter concern over the 
once-forgotten government power of eminent domain); see also Tresa Baldas, States Ride 
Post-Kelo Wave of Legislation, LAW.COM (Aug. 2, 2005), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005544647 (stating that 
lawmakers in 28 states have introduced more than 70 post-Kelo bills). 
 6. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 7. BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009). 
 8. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep‟t, 170 So. 2d 846, 848 (Fla. 1964). 
 9. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring that the property be taken for “public use” and 
the owner be given “just compensation”). 
 10. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”  
Id.  This clause provides the greatest amount of economic justice to individuals.  It should 
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Just Compensation Clause,
11
 or the Public Use Clause,
12
 this section 
prohibits taking private property for public use without just 
compensation.
13
  Although the Takings Clause specifically limits only 
federal actions, courts apply the restraints to the states though the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14
 
The Fifth Amendment imposes two limitations or restrictions on the 
power of eminent domain.  First, the government can take private property 
only if it provides “just compensation” to the owner,
15
 and second, the 
property taken must be for public use.
16
  These two limitations, in theory 
together, safeguard property owners against excessive, unpredictable, and 
unfair use of the government‟s eminent domain power.
17
  States enact 
legislation within these limitations, and local governments must, in turn, 
comply with the state law when exercising eminent domain power.  When 
local action is challenged, the reviewing court will consider whether the 
exercise of eminent domain power was rationally related to a conceivable 
public purpose and whether the legislature might reasonably consider the 
 
be noted that the Takings Clause comes from the Magna Carta and the founding fathers 
thought it essential to include it in the Constitution.  William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 
(1995) (discussing the history of the Takings Clause). 
 11. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg‟l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
307 (2002). 
 12. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, ratified July 9 1968, provides that “[n]o state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”  For a discussion of how the concerns raised by the Thirteenth Amendment  manifest 
themselves in the context of takings cases, see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 
504 (2005), Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906), and 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).  Justice 
Stevens, in the Kelo opinion, cites Strickley, among others, as precedent for the U.S. 
Supreme Court‟s use of the broader “public purpose” test, as opposed to the narrow “use by 
the public” test.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479-80. 
 15. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 307 n.1. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for 
public use without just compensation.  And “just compensation” means the full 
monetary equivalent of the property taken.  The owner is to be put in the same 
position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been 
taken.  In enforcing the constitutional mandate, the Court at an early date 
adopted the concept of market value: the owner is entitled to the fair market 
value of the property at the time of the taking. 
U.S. v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970). 
 16. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 507 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 17. Id. at 496 (O‟Conner, J., dissenting). 
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use public.
18
 
In Kelo, the City of New London (“City” or “New London”) sought to 
rejuvenate a waterfront section of the town that was designated as a 
“distressed municipality.”
19
  Such rejuvenation would allow the City to 
attract new industry, specifically Pfizer Corporation, which would create 
jobs and increase tax revenue.
20
  To reach this goal, the City designated the 
New London Development Corporation (NLDC) to spearhead 
redevelopment efforts.
21
  The NLDC successfully negotiated the purchase 
of the majority of the parcels of land within the targeted redevelopment 
area, but a minority of property owners refused to sell their property.
22
  In 
response to the holdout property owners, the NLDC instituted 
condemnation proceedings.
23
  The owners of the condemned property filed 
suit, and the case eventually worked its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
24
  
At issue was whether the City‟s decision, pursuant to a Connecticut state 
statute, to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfied 
the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
25
  The statute 
expressed “a legislative determination that the taking of land, even 
developed land, as part of an economic development project [was] a „public 
use‟ and in the „public interest.‟”
26
  The Kelo court examined the 
Connecticut statute
27
 and concluded that a fair interpretation of the term 
 
 18. Id. at 476. 
 19. Id. at 473. 
 20.  Id. at 495. 
 21. Id. at 473. 
 22. Id. at 472. 
 23. Id. at 473. 
 24. Originating in the New London Superior Court of Connecticut in 2000, a permanent 
restraining order prohibiting the taking of some of the properties was granted, but relief was 
denied as to other properties.  Kelo v. City of New London, No. KNL-CV-01-0557299-S, 
2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. March 13, 2002).  On appeal in 2004, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the “economic 
development” in question qualified as a valid public use under federal and state law and all 
of the City‟s proposed takings were valid.  Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 
(Conn. 2004).  On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, rendering its 
decision in 2005.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  A rehearing was 
denied later that same year.  Id. at 1158. 
 25. Id. at 477. 
 26. Id. at 476. 
 27. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2011).  The Connecticut statute expressing that an 
economic development project is in the “public use” states: 
It is found and declared that the economic welfare of the state depends upon the 
continued growth of industry and business within the state; that the acquisition 
and improvement of unified land and water areas and vacated commercial 
plants to meet the needs of industry and business should be in accordance with 
local, regional and state planning objectives; that such acquisition and 
improvement often cannot be accomplished through the ordinary operations of 
private enterprise at competitive rates of progress and economies of cost; that 
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“public use” would encompass economic development, even if such 
development occurred at the hands of a private developer.
28
 
New London defended its conduct by asserting that taking private 
property for economic development, even when such development would 
be executed by a private developer, rather than directly by the government, 
served a public purpose because the resulting economic benefits, in the 
form of jobs and tax revenue, would inure to the benefit of all citizens of 
New London, including the displaced homeowners.
29
  Agreeing with the 
City‟s rationale, the Court found that the potential increase in local tax 
revenues by the ultimate redevelopment of the condemned property 
satisfied the public use prerequisite of the Fifth Amendment.
30
 
The Kelo majority clarified that taking property for a “public purpose” 
qualified as a permissible “public use,” pursuant to the Fifth Amendment,
31
 
despite the fact that the taken property would not be open to the general 
public.
32
  This holding, expanding precedent, was instituted at the close of 
the nineteenth century; a time when the Supreme Court applied the Fifth 
Amendment to the States and embraced a broader interpretation of public 
use as an equivalent to public purpose.
33
  In 1954, the Court‟s holding in 
Berman v. Parker
34
 gave broad deference to the state legislatures to define 
public purpose by allowing the District of Columbia to condemn property, 
not only if an area was slum or blighted, but also for prevention of future 
blight that would injure the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.
35
  
Provided the taking was within the State‟s definition of public purpose, the 
Court found it of no consequence that:  (1) some of the property within the 
designated blighted area was non-blighted, or commercial property, and (2) 
portions of the land acquired through eminent domain could be sold or 
leased to private interests.
36
  It concluded: 
 
permitting and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and 
water areas and to acquire and improve or demolish vacated commercial plants 
for industrial and business purposes and, in distressed municipalities, to lend 
funds to businesses and industries within a project area in accordance with such 
planning objectives are public uses and purposes for which public moneys may 
be expended; and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions of 
this chapter is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.   
Id. 
 28. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490. 
 29. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483. 
 30. Id. at 490. 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 32. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479. 
 33. Id. at 480. 
 34. 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954). 
 35. Id. at 31. 
 36. Id. at 31, 35. 
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Property may of course be taken for this redevelopment which, 
standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending. But we have 
said enough to indicate that it is the need of the area as a whole 
which Congress and its agencies are evaluating.  If owner after 
owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on 
the ground that his particular property was not being used against 
the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would 
suffer greatly.  The argument pressed on us is, indeed, a plea to 
substitute the landowner‟s standard of the public need for the 
standard prescribed by Congress. But as we have already stated, 
community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the 
Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building by 
building. . . .  If the Agency considers it necessary in carrying out 
the redevelopment project to take full title to the real property 
involved, it may do so.  It is not for the courts to determine 
whether it is necessary for successful consummation of the 
project that unsafe, unsightly, or insanitary buildings alone be 
taken or whether title to the land be included, any more than it is 
the function of the courts to sort and choose among the various 
parcels selected for condemnation.  The rights of these property 
owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation 
which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking.
37
 
Further, in 1984, in the next well-publicized and sweeping eminent-
domain case, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
38
 the Court permitted 
local government, acting within the statutory definition of public use, to 
transfer ownership from one private individual to another through eminent 
domain.  The Court considered whether the Public Use Clause permitted 
the State of Hawaii to take, with just compensation, title in real property 
from one class of private individuals (lessors), and transfer it to another 
(lessees).  This was done for a stated public purpose of reducing the 
concentration of fee simple ownership in the State, where fewer than 
seventy-two individuals owned nearly fifty percent of the land.
39
  Holding 
that the “public use” requirement was coterminous with the scope of the 
state‟s police powers, the majority, led by Justice Sandra Day O‟Connor, 
expounded that so long as the eminent domain power was rationally related 
to a conceivable public purpose, courts must not find a compensated taking 
 
 37. Id. at 35-36. 
 38. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 39. Id. at 231−32.  An oligopoly existed within Hawaii, where fewer than 75 
individuals owned nearly fifty percent of the land.  The Hawaii legislature enacted the Land 
Reform Act of 1967 to address the concentration of land ownership that was responsible for 
skewing the state‟s residential fee simple market.  The legislature believed that such 
concentration was inflating land prices and injuring the public tranquility and welfare.  Id. at 
232. 
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to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause,
40
 even when the government 
does not intend to use the property itself.
41
 
The rationale utilized in the Berman and Midkiff decisions paved the 
way for the Kelo Court to acquiesce to the Connecticut State Legislature‟s 
broadly defined “public use” so long as the exercise of eminent domain 
power to take property from a private individual rationally related to a 
conceivable public purpose.
42
  In Kelo, the City acted pursuant to a state 
statute that authorized the use of eminent domain to redevelop a distressed 
area as part of a redevelopment plan.
43
  Despite the fact that non-blighted 
parcels located within the blighted area were transferred to a private party, 
the Court found the taking to be valid because the public at large benefited 
from the redevelopment, potential increase in local jobs, and tax revenues 
offered by the local government‟s rejuvenation plan, thus presenting an 
acceptable public use in accordance with state and federal law.
44
 
While Justice Kennedy cautioned against permitting condemnation 
undertaken as a result of “impermissible favoritism” toward a private 
party,
45
 Justice O‟Connor issued a dissent in which she chided the Supreme 
Court‟s failure to determine explicit limitations on how far municipal 
takings extend.
46
  O‟Connor stated: 
Under the banner of economic development, all private property 
is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another 
private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an 
owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more 
beneficial to the public—in the process.
47
 
Even though the transfer of property in Berman and Midkiff was also 
private to private, Justice O‟Connor explained that those takings differed 
from Kelo because the legislative entity mitigated harm by removing or 
redistributing property use.
48
  In Berman and Midkiff, the takings were 
consistent with the Public Use Clause because “the extraordinary, 
precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on 
society—in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and in 
Midkiff through oligopoly
49
 resulting from extreme wealth.”
50
  Expressing 
 
 40. Id. at 240−41. 
 41. Id. at 243−44.  “The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain and 
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as 
having only a private purpose.”  Id. 
 42. Id. at 241. 
 43. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). 
 44. Id. at 483. 
 45. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 46. Id. at 494 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 500. 
 49. According to Black‟s Law Dictionary, “oligopoly” is defined as follows:  “Control 
CAVAZOSFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:34 PM 
2011] BEWARE OF WOODEN NICKELS 693 
 
grave concern that Kelo expanded the meaning of “public use” beyond 
traditional “harm on society” condemnation as in Berman and Midkiff, 
O‟Connor asserted, 
[i]t holds that the sovereign may take private property currently 
put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary 
private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some 
secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, 
more jobs, or maybe even aesthetic pleasure.
51
 
O‟Connor‟s dissent was a rallying cry to private property rights 
advocates across the nation.
52
  However, this author opines that Kelo, like 
Berman and Midkiff, was predicated on a public use redevelopment plan 
designed to eradicate “harm on society.”  The transfer of property was also 
private to private.  For that reason, O‟Connor‟s dissent in Kelo was 
contradictory to her majority opinion in Midkiff. 
The cornerstone in each of the takings cases, Berman, Midkiff, and 
Kelo, is the Supreme Court‟s deference to Congress and state legislatures.
53
  
The Court consistently ruled that, so long as the legislation can reasonably 
identify an evil that they are attempting to address, a public purpose will be 
found, and therefore the statute and the actions taken pursuant to it will 
pass constitutional muster.
54
  Citing Midkiff, the Court reiterated in Kelo 
that “[w]hen the legislature‟s purpose is legitimate and its means are not 
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of 
takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of 
socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal 
courts.”
55
 
The dissenters offered a narrow test requiring “clear and convincing 
evidence” to show that the proposed economic benefit would, with 
reasonable certainty, come to pass.
56
  However, the majority was reluctant 
to adopt the proposal, concerned that such a test would impose “a 
 
or domination of a market by a few large sellers, creating high prices and low output similar 
to those found in a monopoly.”  BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (8th ed. 2004). 
 50. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 501. 
 52. See id. at 494 (citing the Bill of Rights to emphasize the importance of freedom 
from governmental interference with regards to personal property). 
 53. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984) (“Subject to 
specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has 
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.  In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, 
is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be 
Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia . . . or the States legislating 
concerning local affairs.”) 
 54. Id. at 245. 
 55. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43). 
 56. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting). 
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„heightened‟ standard of judicial review for takings justified by economic 
development” and represent a greater departure from precedent.
57
  The 
Court emphasized that “[a] constitutional rule that required postponement 
of the judicial approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of 
success of the plan had been assured would unquestionably impose a 
significant impediment to the successful consummation of many such 
plans.”
58
  After considering the consequences, the Court again chose to 
defer to state legislatures to define public use and leave to the courts the 
question of whether the government‟s purpose in taking the property is 
rationally related to a public use.
59
 
It further reminded the dissenters that the doctrines of state 
sovereignty and states‟ rights would allow legislatures to determine 
whether to impose tighter restrictions on economic development despite the 
majority‟s ruling:
 60
 
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State 
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings 
power.  Indeed, many States already impose “public use” 
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline.  Some of 
these requirements have been established as a matter of state 
constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent 
domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which 
takings may be exercised.
61
 
Thus, it is incumbent on state legislatures to carefully consider their 
definition of “public purpose” or “public use” and to strive to achieve 
balance between the rights of private property owners and the needs of 
counties and municipalities to maintain local vitality and viability. 
 
 57. Id. at 477. 
 58. Id. at 488. 
 59. Id. 
 60. The deference is expressed in the doctrine of “the adequate and independent state 
ground,” which was addressed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson in Herb v. 
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945). 
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it 
will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent 
state grounds.  The reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought to 
warrant statement.  It is found in the partitioning of power between the state and 
federal judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction.  Our only 
power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly 
adjudge federal rights.  And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to 
revise opinions.  We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the 
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its view 
of federal law, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory 
opinion. 
TALBOT D‟ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 18 (1991). 
 61. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
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III. REACTION TO KELO 
With some exceptions, the reaction to Kelo was uniformly negative as 
naysayers opined that local governments would run amok with speculative 
redevelopment plans.
62
  For example, elected officials and the general 
populace widely condemned the decision as an unprecedented expansion of 
local government power to seize private property for dubious purposes.
63
  
Attorneys representing property owners were outraged that the government 
could take one person‟s property and give it to another in the name of 
economic development, which is not in line with the well-established 
American principles of private ownership.
64
  On the other hand, “attorneys 
representing municipalities and private developers in eminent domain cases 
hailed the high Court‟s ruling, maintaining that eminent domain is essential 
to economic development, and that critics of the ruling are overreacting.”
65
  
Meanwhile, during the last four years, scholars, distinguished professors, 
and newspapers have written extensively on post-Kelo reforms,
66
 and 
joining the discussion are commentators, property rights advocates, 
attorneys, and politicians on the need to protect property owners from 
Kelo-type takings.
67
  The literature ranges from warnings of the possible 
 
 62. David A. Dana, Colloquoy, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning The 
Poor After Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 365 (2007). 
 63. John D. Echeverria, The Myth That Kelo Has Expanded the Scope of Eminent 
Domain, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL‟Y INST. (July 20, 2005), 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_research/documents/KeloMyth.pdf. 
 64. Steven Seidenberg, Where’s the Revolution?, 95 A.B.A. J. 50  (April 2009), 
available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/wheres_the_revolution.  “Drastic 
Changes in land use law were predicted after the U.S. Supreme Court‟s Kelo ruling, but four 
years later, things don‟t look that different.”  Id. 
 65. Baldas, supra note 5. 
 66. The following are examples of pieces discussing post-Kelo reforms:  DANA 
BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT 
EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 52 (2003); DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE 
FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE IN THE POST-KELO WORLD (2006); Errol E. 
Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1 
(1980); Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the 
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL‟Y REV. 1 (2003); Ilya Somin, The 
Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2136 
(2009); Carrie Johnson, Property Ruling Appalls Officials, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 25, 
2005, at 1B; Les Christie, Kelo’s Revenge: Voters Restrict Eminent Domain, 
CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 8, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/08/real_estate/kelos_revenge/ (reporting that 69% of Florida 
voters passed the amendment). 
 67. Baldas, supra note 5.  
Legislators in Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, New Jersey and Michigan are 
mobilizing to support state constitutional amendments prohibiting eminent 
domain for private development.  In California, which has some of the strictest 
proposed legislation, two bills would prohibit the exercise of eminent domain 
CAVAZOSFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:34 PM 
696 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
abuses evolving from the Kelo decision to precautions on legislatures 
reacting too quickly.
68
 
States were cautioned not to act too quickly in their haste to ease 
constituents‟ concerns about Kelo.
69
  For example, Patricia Salkin, an 
associate dean and director of the Government Law Center at Albany Law 
School, warned that “quick reactions [to Kelo] can lead to ineffective 
policy.”
70
  David Parkhurst, principal legislative counsel for the National 
League of Cities, expressed, “it‟s good that Kelo has brought eminent 
domain under the light of state examination.  „As a state-derived power, 
eminent domain is best handled at the state and local level.‟”
71
  Another 
concern conveyed among those who took a neutral position on the eminent 
domain question “is that fast-enacted legislation will be overly 
restrictive.”
72
 
Supporters of broad discretion in takings, such as Carolyn Coleman of 
the National League of Cities, maintain that “eminent domain is a valuable 
and constitutional economic development tool.”
73
  Many American 
communities have been redeveloped under the taking power of eminent 
 
for private use under any circumstances, while lawmakers in Texas, Minnesota, 
Delaware and Connecticut would simply limit the use of eminent domain for 
private projects or tighten eminent domain procedures. 
Id.; see also Seidenberg, supra note 64 (discussing the current debate amongst 
policymakers). 
 68. See Gary Boulard, Eminent domain--for the greater good? The U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Kelo v. New London has prompted states to look at their own eminent domain 
practices, THE FREE LIBRARY BY FARLEX (January 1, 2006), 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Eminent+domain--
for+the+greater+good%3f+The+U.S.+Supreme+Court+decision...-a0140519588 (remarking 
upon the debates currently going on within state legislatures as to eminent domain powers); 
Elaine Misonzhnik , Panel Calls for Caution on Eminent Domain, THE FREE LIBRARY BY 
FARLEX (November 9, 2005), 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Panel+calls+for+caution+on+eminent+domain.-
a0139211453 (cautioning that changes may soon come to eminent domain legislation, and 
that therefore developers should be careful in assuming they now have a large advantage 
due to Kelo). 
 69. Francesca Jarosz, Before You Grab That Property . . . States Take a Close Look at 
Eminent Domain, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 5, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/bit/2007-01-02/jarosz.shtml. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 4. 
 72. Id. at 5. 
 73. Elizabeth N. Brown, States Fight to Limit Government’s Powers to Take Your 
Home, AARP BULLETIN, 2 (May 12, 2008), 
http://bulletin.aarp.org/yourworld/yourhome/articles/eminent_domain.html (“Public 
purchases of „blighted‟ property-through eminent domain or the prospect that it will be 
invoked if homeowners refuse to sell-have been used successfully for decades to transform 
neighborhoods into needed infrastructure or revitalized zones.”). 
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domain.
74
  Social advocates stress that without this tool, economically 
distressed communities will perish.
75
  Carla Main, a journalist and former 
editor of The National Law Journal, emphasizes that “[e]minent domain is 
an efficient and orderly way to clear large, contiguous parcels of land.  It is 
the only way to deal with the problem of holdouts.  There is nothing to be 
ashamed of in using eminent domain to improve communities.”
76
 
Despite these calls for circumspection, many state legislatures quickly 
passed statutes to ensure that nothing like Kelo would ever happen in their 
states.
77
  Over 43 states
78
 passed legislation either restricting local 
governments‟ use of eminent domain for economic development or blight 
condemnation or redefining the term “blight.”
79
  Other reforms included 
statutory or constitutional amendments.
80
  However, in Florida the reaction 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Riviera Beach Eminent Domain Suit Dropped, ABC 25 WPBF, May 10, 2007, 
http://www.wpbf.com/news/13297070/detail.html (discussing the suit); see also John 
Kramer & Lisa Knepper, New Study Details Devastating Effects of Eminent Domain Abuse 
on African Americans, CASTLE COALITION (Feb. 14, 2007), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1786393/posts (discussing the issue). 
 76. Carla T. Main, How Eminent Domain Ran Amok, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 22, 
2005), http://realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-10_21_05_CTM.html. 
 77. Echeverria, supra note 63. 
 78. Op-Ed, Pfizer and Kelo’s Ghost Town, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A20,  
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704402404574527513453636326.html. 
 79. Restricting Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Purposes, HOUSE RES. ORG.: 
TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, January 3, 2007, at 5-6, available at 
http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/interim/int79-6.pdf (“Twenty-one [states] have restricted 
the use of eminent domain for purposes of economic development, increasing tax revenue, 
or transferring private property to a private entity.  Ten states restrict the use of eminent 
domain to „blighted‟ properties and place an emphasis on public health, safety, and welfare 
criteria when designating blighted properties.  A number of others have: adopted more 
limited definitions of „public use‟; required certain actions during the process of exercising 
eminent domain such as public notice, public hearings, and local government approval; 
required compensation at greater than fair market value; placed a moratorium on eminent 
domain for economic development; and established legislative committees to study the 
issue.”); John E. Kramer, Special Interest Win, Property Owners Loses With Delaware 
Governor’s Veto of Eminent Domain Reform, CASTLE COALITION (Jan. 28, 2008), 
http://castlecoalition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=732; see also 
CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM 
LEGISLATION SINCE KELO (June 2007), available at 
www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf [hereinafter 
CASTLE COALITION] (developing a classification system to evaluate the effectiveness of 
post-Kelo legislation reform on a state by state basis.  For example, five states received a 
passing grade of “A-”.  They are Florida, Michigan, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota.). 
 80. See Seidenberg, supra note 64 (“Drastic Changes in land use law were predicted 
after the U.S. Supreme Court‟s Kelo ruling, but four years later, things don‟t look that 
different.”). 
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to Kelo was unwarranted.
81
 The Florida Constitution already afforded 
private property owners protection from Kelo-type takings for 
redevelopment and revitalization.  The legislature nonetheless, in response 
to Kelo-type takings, amended the statutes governing eminent domain. 
Specifically, the legislature enacted sections 73.013−14, Florida 
Statutes.  Section 73.013 restricts the ability of condemning authorities to 
transfer property acquired through eminent domain to private parties.  
Section 73.014 declares the elimination of nuisance, slum or blight 
conditions as a public purpose for which eminent domain may be used.  
Florida‟s opinion of what constitutes a “public purpose” was more 
restrictive than what the federal courts have determined satisfied the 
“public use” requirement of the United States Constitution.  Florida‟s 
reaction—flatly banning economic development
82
 or blight 
condemnation
83
—should not be hailed as the model alternative to Kelo-type 
takings.  For instance, the Texas legislature‟s response was to simply limit 
or eliminate the use of eminent domain as it relates to economic 
redevelopment, “unless economic development is secondary to the main 
objective of eliminating real blight.”
84
  Kelo reaffirms that the government 
is not allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose 
when the main purpose is to bestow a private benefit, which translates into 
current legislations‟ ban on pretextual takings.
85
 
 
 81. The due process clause of the Florida Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall 
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law” as worded in article I, 
section 9.  In addition, article X sections 6 (a) and (b) of the Florida Constitution provides 
limitations on the power of the legislature to take property by eminent domain and requiring 
it to be prescribed by law. 
 82. FLA. STAT. § 163.335(7) (2006). 
It is further found and declared that the prevention or elimination of a slum area 
or blighted area as defined in this part and the preservation or enhancement of 
the tax base are not public uses or purposes for which private property may be 
taken by eminent domain and do not satisfy the public purpose requirement of s. 
6(a), Art. X of the State Constitution. 
Id., available at 
http://archive.flsenate.gov/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=
&URL=Ch0163/SEC335.HTM&Title=->2006->Ch0163->Section%20335#0163.335. 
 83. FLA. STAT. § 73.014(2) (2006) (prohibiting the taking of private property “for the 
purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or blight conditions,” and therefore eliminating 
nuisance, slum, and blight prevention as valid public purposes for the taking of private 
property via eminent domain in Florida). 
 84. S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tex. 2005), available at 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/792/billtext/html/SB00007F.htm; see also Press 
Release, Office of the Governor Rick Perry, Gov. Perry Signs New Law Protecting Property 
Rights (Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://governor.state.tx.us/news/press-release/3239 
(announcing Governor Perry‟s reasons for signing Senate Bill 7). 
 85. Somin, supra note 66, at 2136 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 US 469, 
478 (2005)).   
CAVAZOSFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:34 PM 
2011] BEWARE OF WOODEN NICKELS 699 
 
It is important to look at the law in several states to achieve a 
comprehensive picture.  In Alabama, the legislature enacted laws 
prohibiting the use of eminent domain to transfer property from its original 
owner to industrial, office, or residential developers, or retail 
corporations.
86
  In Nevada, legislation restricts the use of eminent domain 
by prohibiting agencies from using it for economic redevelopment 
purposes, except where there is a finding of blight for each individual 
parcel within the redevelopment area.
87
  Utah also prohibits local economic 
redevelopment agencies from acquiring property by eminent domain.
88
 
Colorado amended the public use definition to “not include the taking of 
private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic 
development or enhancement of tax revenue,” but still generally allows a 
taking solely for the purpose of furthering a public use.
89
 
In Iowa, legislation now requires a property-by-property assessment of 
blight designation; only when 75 percent of the properties are blighted can 
non-blighted properties be taken by eminent domain.
90
  This seems like a 
fair rule, but it is easy to argue that a higher percentage requirement would 
be better.  I suggest that Florida should have redefined blight and 
implemented a percentage designation like Iowa to determine when 
properties can be taken by eminent domain.  However, it needs to be 
considered that some critics still find Iowa‟s reform ineffective because the 
extensive definition of blight in Iowa‟s legislation depends on “the 
definition of such terms as „deteriorated structures‟ and „excessive and 
uncorrected deterioration of site.‟”
91
  Since, as a practical matter, Kelo 
applies only where state legislatures subscribe to the same public use 
definition employed by the Connecticut legislature, states such as Florida, 
Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, and Tennessee, which more narrowly 
define the term, need not accept the broad finding of the Kelo Court.
92
  
Instead, these states mandate that the public “directly” benefit from the 
taking.
93
  This narrow test is difficult to administer, as noted by the Kelo 
 
 86. S.B. 68, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2005), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.al.us/Searchableinstruments/2005FS/Bills/SB68.htm. 
 87. S.B. 326, 2005 Leg., 73d Sess. (Nev. 2005), available at  
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/73rd/bills/SB/SB326_EN.pdf. 
 88. S.B. 184, 2005 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005), available at 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2005/bills/sbillenr/sb0184.htm. 
 89. CASTLE COALITION, supra note 79. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Somin, supra note 66, at 2130. 
 92. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (“When the Court began 
applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the 
broader and more natural interpretation of public use as „public purpose.‟” (citing Fallbrook 
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158−64 (1896))). 
 93. Elisabeth Sperow, The Kelo Legacy: Political Accountability, Not Legislation, Is 
The Cure, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 405, 420 (2007). 
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Court, as it is unclear what proportion of the population needs to have 
access to the property and at what price this is to be achieved.
94
  The 
majority argued that the narrow use of the public test is “impractical given 
the diverse and always evolving needs of society.”
95
  I opine that Florida‟s 
response was hasty in comparison to other states‟ approaches to legislative 
reform.  Florida‟s decision appears to be reactive as opposed to responsive. 
IV. A CASE STUDY: ENTHUSIASM RUN AMOK IN FLORIDA 
Florida is a case study in irony.  Before Kelo, the state broadly 
supported the policy of taking private property for redeveloping localities 
that were struggling economically in order to improve the public welfare 
and increase the local tax base.
96
  However, after Kelo, and reacting to the 
public outcry over takings of non-blighted properties for private economic 
development, the federal government passed the “Private Property Rights 
Protection Act of 2005.”
97
  The bill‟s sole purpose was to prevent a Kelo 
 
 94. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 (2005). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 472. 
 97. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), available at 
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/HR4128.pdf.  The Private Property Rights Protection Act of 
2005 (“PPRP”) prohibited the federal government from using the power of eminent domain 
to take private property for economic development.  Id.  The PPRP also provided for the 
withholding of federal economic development funds from state or local governments that do 
so.  Id.  Section Two of the PPRP prohibits any state or political subdivision from exercising 
its power of eminent domain for economic development if that state or political subdivision 
receives federal economic development funds during the fiscal year.  Id.  This section 
defines “economic development” as taking private property and conveying or leasing it to a 
private entity for commercial enterprise carried on for profit or to increase tax revenue, the 
tax base, employment, or general economic health.  Id.  The section also makes a state or 
political subdivision that violates such prohibition ineligible for any such funds for two 
fiscal years.  Id.  Further, it provides that such a state or political subdivision is not ineligible 
for such funds if it returns all real property that was improperly taken and replaces or repairs 
any property that was destroyed or damaged.  Id.  Section Three “[p]rohibits the federal 
government from exercising its power of eminent domain for economic development.”  Id.; 
see also S. 1313, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), available at 
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/S1313.pdf (proposing “[t]o protect homes, small businesses, 
and other private property rights, by limiting the power of eminent domain”).; H.R. 3135, 
109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/HR3135.pdf. 
(proposing “[t]o protect private property rights”); H.R. 3405, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), 
available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/HR3405.pdf (proposing “[t]o prohibit the 
provision of Federal economic development assistance for any State or locality that uses the 
power of eminent domain power to obtain property for private commercial development or 
that fails to pay relocation costs to persons displaced by use of the power of eminent domain 
for economic development purposes”); The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes 
and Other Private Property: Hearing on H.R. 4128 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
(2005) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1612&wit_id=4543 (discussing the 
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situation, taking private property for economic development, from 
occurring in the state or local government.
98
  Florida is the only state to 
enact laws flatly rejecting condemnations based on “economic 
development” and “blight” rationales.
99
  The Florida Constitution prohibits 
takings of private property unless the taking is for a designated “public 
purpose” and the property owner is paid full compensation.
100
  Over the 
years, the definition of “public purpose” in Florida has been expanded 
through case law.  For example, in Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard 
County, the Florida Supreme Court held that the power of eminent domain 
should be limited to basic essentials like roads, schools, drainage projects, 
parks, and playgrounds.
101
  In 1975, the Florida Supreme Court held in 
Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development Authority of Fort Lauderdale that 
the “public interest must dominate the private gain” in order to acquire 
property for the exercise of eminent domain.
102
  Continuing this trend, in 
 
importance of Fifth Amendment rights and providing protection from taking by eminent 
domain).  Section Four of the PPRP created a new federal cause of action for any individual 
suffering injury as a result of a violation of the Act, with a provision that allowed a 
prevailing plaintiff to recover attorneys‟ fees.  Id. 
 98. H.R. 4128; S. 1313; H.R. 3135; H.R. 3405; see also The Kelo Decision: 
Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: Hearing on H.R. 4128 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 97. 
 99. Dana, supra note 62, at 375.  A blighted area is defined as “[a] declining area 
suffering from seriously decreasing property values and not likely to recover without some 
outside intervention.  More than simply a market slip, a blighted area can be identified by 
deteriorating buildings, increased crime rates, and decreased occupancies.”  Blight Area, 
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/blighted+area 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011).  Economic development is defined as efforts that seek to 
improve the economic well-being and quality of life for a community by creating and/or 
retaining jobs and supporting or growing incomes and the tax base.  Economic 
Development, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM,  
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/economic+development (last visited Feb. 16, 
2011). 
 100. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a) (“No private property shall be taken except for a public 
purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner secured by deposit in the 
registry of the court and available to the owner.”).  Florida courts have determined that “full 
compensation” includes payment of the owner‟s attorney‟s fees and expert costs, so that he 
or she is “made whole” after the taking.  Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. 
DuPree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1958).  See also U.S. v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 15-
16 (1970) (“The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for 
public use without just compensation.  And „just compensation‟ means the full monetary 
equivalent of the property taken.  The owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as 
he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.  In enforcing the constitutional 
mandate, the Court at an early date adopted the concept of market value: the owner is 
entitled to the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking.  But this basic 
measurement of compensation has been hedged with certain refinements developed over the 
years in the interest of effectuating the constitutional guarantee.”). 
 101. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard Cnty., 159 Fla. 311, 318 (Fla. 1947). 
 102. 315 So. 2d 451, 456 (Fla. 1975). 
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the 1977 case of Deseret Ranches of Florida, Inc. v. Bowman, the Court 
upheld a state statute that allowed a private party to use eminent domain to 
obtain an easement of necessity over an adjacent property.
103
  The Court 
concluded that the statute‟s purpose was predominantly public and any 
benefit to the private party was very minor compared to the public 
purpose.
104
  Then, in 1988, the Court broadened the application of the 
public purpose doctrine even more in Department of Transportation v. 
Fortune Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n.
105
  Here, the Court concluded that 
“[t]he term „public purpose‟ does not mean simply that the land is used for 
a specific public function” such as building roads.
106
  Public purpose 
includes various projects that benefit the state in a “tangible, foreseeable 
way.”
107
 
Prior to Kelo, the Florida legislature did not expressly use the 
terminology “economic development” as a pretext for public purpose in 
eminent domain takings.   However, the Florida Supreme Court addressed 
economic development in Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency of Tampa, 
where it acknowledged that mere economic redevelopment could not 
justify the use of eminent domain and proposed a stricter standard.
108
  An 
opinion by Justice Hobson eloquently concurs that “[t]he predominance of 
esthetic considerations—cloaked in the guise of general welfare” —was 
unconstitutional.
109
  The Court said that a “public benefit” is not 
synonymous with “public purpose.”
110
  Although the public might 
incidentally benefit from a redevelopment plan, there must be some 
“reasonable necessity” for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
111
  
What remained undecided was whether economic development was 
equivalent to public benefit, or fell somewhere along the spectrum towards 
public purpose.  The Florida Legislature decided to act. 
In reaction to Kelo, the Florida Legislature passed House Bill 1567 to 
apply to all eminent domain petitions filed after its effective date of May 
 
 103. 349 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1977). 
 104. Id. at 156. 
 105. Dep‟t of Transp. v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‟n, 532 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1988). 
 106. Id. at 1270. 
 107. Id. 
 108. 115 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1959) (holding valid provisions that allow the clearance 
and private redevelopment of “slum areas” where the redevelopment relates directly to the 
public‟s health, safety, and welfare); see also Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of Fort 
Lauderdale, 315 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1975) (noting that Grubstein validated 
“condemnation of blighted or slum areas for public housing as a public purpose . . . based 
upon proof that the area involved had become infested with crime and disease affecting the 
public health and welfare, which, of course, is a proper public purpose . . . .”). 
 109. Grubstein, 115 So. 2d at 752 (Hobson, J., concurring specially). 
 110. Id. at 751. 
 111. Id. 
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11, 2006.
112
  The new law amended Florida‟s eminent domain statute, 
Chapter 73, Florida Statutes, by creating a new section prohibiting “the 
transfer of property taken by use of eminent domain to a private person or 
entity or a natural person.”
113
  Under the new law, the exercise of eminent 
domain may only be used if it falls within the exception,
114
 which primarily 
relates to governmental-type functions, such as common-carrier services or 
systems, public infrastructure, public or private utilities for electrical 
service, storm water or telephone services, along with several others.
115
  
Chapter 73 also restricts takings for blight condemnation.
116
 
A. Pre-Kelo Eminent Domain and Community Redevelopment in Florida 
Prior to Kelo, Florida‟s eminent domain statutes had a significant 
impact on the development of its local communities.
117
  The Florida 
Constitution and Florida Statutes did not explicitly prohibit the taking of 
private property for the purpose of economic development, and the Florida 
Supreme Court had not specifically ruled on using eminent domain to take 
 
 112. H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006); see also H.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (proposing an amendment to the state Constitution to prohibit the 
transfer of private property taken by eminent domain to a natural person or private entity; 
provides that the Legislature may permit exceptions allowing the transfer of such private 
property by general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of each house). 
 113. FLA. STAT. §73.013(1) (2006). 
 114. FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (2006). 
 115. H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006); see also H.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (addressing governmental exceptions to eminent domain). 
 116.  
73.014 Taking property to eliminate nuisance, slum, or blight conditions 
prohibited.— 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter provision, 
ordinance, statute, or special law, the state, any political subdivision as defined 
in s. 1.01(8), or any other entity to which the power of eminent domain is 
delegated may not exercise the power of eminent domain to take private 
property for the purpose of abating or eliminating a public nuisance. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter provision, 
ordinance, statute, or special law, abating or eliminating a public nuisance is not 
a valid public purpose or use for which private property may be taken by 
eminent domain and does not satisfy the public purpose requirement of s. 6(a), 
Art. X of the State Constitution. This subsection does not diminish the power of 
counties or municipalities to adopt or enforce county or municipal ordinances 
related to code enforcement or the elimination of public nuisances to the extent 
such ordinances do not authorize the taking of private property by eminent 
domain. 
Fla. H.B. 1567(2). 
 117. See generally Community Redevelopment Act of 1969, FLA. STAT. §§ 163.330-
163.463 (1969) (providing means by which slum and blighted areas can be revitalized). 
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land from a private citizen and then transferring it to another private citizen 
or entity.
118
  Before Kelo, redevelopment efforts in some states that 
struggled economically were generally supported through taking property 
in order to improve public welfare and to increase the local tax base.
119
  
Prior to 2006, a valid taking in Florida required the condemning authority 
to: 
(1)  Possess [the] authority to exercise . . . eminent domain; 
 
(2)  Demonstrate that a taking of private property is pursued for 
a valid public purpose and that all statutory requirements 
have been fulfilled; 
 
(3)  Offer evidence showing that the [under]taking is 
reasonabl[y], [if not] absolutely, necessary to accomplish the 
public purpose of the taking; and 
 
(4)  Pay the property owner full compensation as determined by 
a [twelve]-member jury.
120
 
These elements did not directly prohibit the taking of private property 
for economic development purposes.
121
  Consequently, since the Florida 
Constitution did not expressly authorize takings for economic development 
purposes, the Community Redevelopment Act of 1969
122
 granted broad 
“home rule”
123
 authority to cities and counties, including the authority to 
exercise the power of eminent domain for any municipal or county 
purpose.
124
  For example, the City of Tampa used the power of eminent 
domain to acquire land to build parking garages in Ybor City.
125
  The City 
of St. Petersburg exercised eminent domain to amass six blighted acres and 
 
 118. FLA. H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, HB 1567 EMINENT DOMAIN (2006), available at 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1567b.JC.d
oc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1567&Session=2006. 
 119. See DARREN SPRINGER, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, STATE POLICY AND THE 
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, available at 
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/05StatePolicyEminent.pdf (discussing the changes various 
states made to their standards for eminent domain after the Kelo decision). 
 120. FLA H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 118, at 5. 
 121. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.330-163.463 (2006). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. ch. 125 (relating to counties); id. ch. 166 (relating to municipalities); see 
also id. ch. 163, pt. III (describing the purpose of “home rule” authority as providing local 
government with self-governance to ensure that local issues and problems are handled at the 
level of government closest to the citizens that they represent). 
 124. See id. ch. 125 (relating to counties); id. ch. 166 (relating to municipalities). 
 125. Carrie Weimar, Crimping Eminent Domain, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, 
at 1B, available at 
http://www.sptimes.com/2006/11/13/Tampabay/Crimping_eminent_doma.shtml. 
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created BayWalk, a vibrant downtown shopping and entertainment area.
126
  
Cities like Jacksonville and Tampa have significant redevelopment plans, 
which have led to growth over the past few decades.
127
  The use of eminent 
domain in these cases can be characterized as public purpose because the 
city redeveloped land for the use of all citizens and visitors. 
Nevertheless, many of the critics argue that eminent domain is a “root 
of all evils” because the power of eminent domain was abused at times 
throughout history.
128
  One such example occurred when the City of 
Daytona Beach relied on a 24-year old blight finding to justify condemning 
the bustling boardwalk businesses to enable a major facelift along the 
beachside.
129
  In the five-year period of 1998−2002, “there were more than 
10,000 actual and threatened condemnations for the benefit of private 
parties around the nation.”
130
  Florida municipalities were responsible for 
more than one-fifth of that total.”
131
  It is apparent that Florida was replete 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. See CRA Basics, FLA. REDEVELOPMENT ASS‟N, http://redevelopment.net/technical-
assistance/q-a-for-cras/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (“The designation is used by Florida cities 
of all sizes, from Jacksonville and Tampa to Madison and Apalachicola.  Many familiar 
locations, such as Church Street in Orlando, Ybor City in Tampa and the beachfront in Ft. 
Lauderdale are successful examples of Community Redevelopment Areas.”). 
 128. Carla T. Main, How Eminent Domain Ran Amok, POL‟Y REV., Oct.-Nov. 2005, 
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7292; see also 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) 
(demonstrating effects of eminent domain); Elizabeth Nolan Brown, States Fight to Limit 
Government’s Powers to Take Your Home, AARP BULLETIN, May 12, 2008, 
http://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/info-04-
2009/eminent_domain.html (demonstrating examples of unpopular government usage of 
eminent domain); U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN 30-
31 (2006), available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-28 (describing negative 
effects of eminent domain). 
 129. In 2005, a Circuit Court Judge upheld the condemnations of three Floridian 
properties, in Daytona Beach, as part of a project to replace one set of boardwalk businesses 
for another.  City of Daytona Beach v. Mathas, No. 2004-31846-CICI (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 
2005).  Maybe a 24 year-old blight finding should be revised before any action is taken.  See 
Ludmilla Lelis, Daytona Businesses Must Sell Property, Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 20, 2005, at 
A1; Ludmilla Lelis, Joyland Owners Settle with Daytona, Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 2, 2004, at 
B3. 
 130. Supreme Court’s Kelo Decision and Potential Congressional Responses: Hearing 
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the  Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 109th Cong. 
109-60 at 25 (Sept. 22, 2005), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju23573.000/hju23573_0.HTM. 
 131. See Protecting Kelo’s Victims in Riviera Beach, Florida: City Seeks to Use Eminent 
Domain to Replace Lower-Income & Minority Residents with Wealthier Ones, INSTITUTE 
FOR JUSTICE,  http://www.ij.org/component/content/article/37-privatepropertyrights/965-
riviera-beach-florida-eminent-domain-background (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).  This article 
cites DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE 
REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 2, 52 (2003) available at 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED_report.pdf (noting 2,122 threatened and filed 
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with Kelo-type policy takings, but those policies remained untested in 
courts.  As a result, Florida became among the worst abusers of eminent 
domain in the nation.
132
 
Notwithstanding what critics have stated, using eminent domain to 
cure blight, on its face, is not an abuse of power.  Economic development 
has been considered a factor in the public context because the legislature 
determined it to be a public purpose for which municipalities and counties 
may expend public funds.
133
  Since the legislature declared economic 
development as a public purpose for spending public funds, economic 
development could conceivably have been considered a public purpose in 
the context of the exercise of eminent domain power.
134
 
Professor David Dana points out that, “[a]ll or virtually all 
condemnations designated as blight condemnations could be characterized 
as economic development condemnations, inasmuch as the end goal of 
blight removal is economic redevelopment . . . .”
135
  The author‟s concern is 
not with Florida critically evaluating each economic proposal, but rather 
the summary fashion in which this legislation mandates rejection of all 
proposals involving private development or use.  Indeed, under this 
legislation, property that has been previously condemned and taken by the 
state could not be transferred to a private citizen for economic 
development—even if the city has vacated the property—unless authorized 
by general law and passed by three-fifths vote of each house of the 
legislature.  Needless to say, obtaining such approval from the legislature 
could delay projects to the point of dissuading developers from pursuing 
them. 
In the wake of Kelo, the Florida Legislature echoed Justice 
O‟Connor‟s fear and amended the state‟s eminent domain law by enacting 
new provisions prohibiting the transfer to private parties of property taken 
through eminent domain and eliminating the use of the power of eminent 
domain to resolve cases of public nuisance, slum, or blight conditions.
136
  
 
condemnations for private benefit between 1998 and 2002). 
 132. Gearing Up for Battle, CASTLE COALITION, 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=137&Itemid
=165 (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
 133. FLA. H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 1567, EMINENT DOMAIN 9−10 (2006), available at 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1567b.JC.d
oc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1567&Session=2006. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Dana, supra note 62, at 369. 
 136. FLA. STAT. § 70.013 (2006); see also H.R.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla 
2006) (amending Florida Constitution by requiring “[p]rivate property taken by eminent 
domain pursuant to a petition to initiate condemnation proceedings filed on or after January 
2, 2007, may not be conveyed to a natural person or private entity except as provided by 
general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of each house of the 
Legislature.”). 
CAVAZOSFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:34 PM 
2011] BEWARE OF WOODEN NICKELS 707 
 
The new laws impact both substantive and procedural elements of Florida 
eminent domain law.
137
 
The key substantive and procedural component of section 73.013, 
Florida Statutes, is that condemning authorities cannot take private 
property unless it falls under one of the specific exceptions.
138
  After a 
condemning authority holds title for ten years, it may, after issuing a notice 
and allowing competitive bidding to take place, transfer the property to a 
private entity.
139
  If certain requirements are met, the property can be 
transferred in less than ten years.
140
 
Further, Florida state legislators designed section 73.013 to limit 
condemning authorities‟ exercise of eminent domain
141
 by placing specific 
limitations on taking property and transferring it to private entities.
142
  The 
rule further designates exceptions pursuant to which private property can 
be taken and given to a private entity.
143
  The exceptions restrict local 
 
 137. Substantive components are those that determine rights and obligations, while 
procedural components cover rules for governing the process for determining the rights. 
 138. 2006-11 Fla. Laws 3 (stating in F.S. § 73.014 that “[t]aking property to eliminate 
nuisance, slum or blight conditions [is] prohibited”).  Some of the exceptions include:  
public carriers/systems, roads, public or private utilities (for specific listed purposes, i.e. 
wastewater services), and providing public infrastructure. 
 139. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(2)(a) (providing that if after at least ten years have elapsed 
since the condemning authority acquired the property, then the property may be 
subsequently transferred to another natural person or private entity without restriction 
provided public notice and competitive bidding took place). 
 140. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(2)(f)(1) (providing that: (1) the condemning authority or 
governmental entity holding title to the property documents that the property is no longer 
needed for the use or purpose for which it was acquired by the condemning authority or for 
which it was transferred to the current titleholder; and (2) the owner from whom the 
property was taken by eminent domain is given the opportunity to repurchase the property at 
the price that he or she received from the condemning authority).  These two provisions 
explain that if the property is no longer needed for the use taken then the previous owner 
can repurchase the property at the price s/he received.  What about the cost to fix it up? 
 141. 2006-11 Fla. Laws 2 (stating in F.S. § 73.013 that “[c]onveyance of property taken 
by eminent domain; preservation of government entity communications services eminent 
domain limitation; exception to restrictions on power of eminent domain.— 
(1)  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter 
provision, ordinance, statute, or special law, if the state, any political 
subdivision as defined in s. 1.01(8), or any other entity to which the power 
of eminent domain is delegated files a petition of condemnation on or after 
the effective date of this section regarding a parcel of real property in this 
state, ownership or control of property acquired pursuant to such petition 
may not be conveyed by the condemning authority or any other entity to a 
natural person or private entity, by lease or otherwise, except that 
ownership or control of property acquired pursuant to such petition may be 
conveyed, by lease or otherwise, to a natural person or private entity.). 
 142. Id. 
 143. 2006-11 Fla. Laws 2-3 (stating in F.S. § 73.013(1)(a)-(h) [Exceptions]: 
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a) For use in providing common carrier services or systems; 
b)  (1) For use as a road or other right-of-way or means that is open to the public 
for transportation, whether at no charge or by toll; 
  (2) For use in the provision of transportation-related services, business 
opportunities, and products pursuant to s. 338.234, on a toll road. 
c) That is a public or private utility for use in providing electricity services or 
systems, natural or manufactured gas services or systems, water and wastewater 
services or systems, storm water or runoff services or systems, sewer services or 
systems, pipeline facilities, telephone services or systems, or similar services or 
systems; 
d) For use in providing public infrastructure; 
e) That occupies, pursuant to a lease, an incidental part of a public property or a 
public facility for the purpose of providing goods or services to the public; 
f) Without restriction, after public notice and competitive bidding unless 
otherwise provided by general law, if less than 10 years have elapsed since the 
condemning authority acquired title to the property and the following conditions 
are met: 
1. The condemning authority or governmental entity holding title to the 
property documents that the property is no longer needed for the use or 
purpose for which it was acquired by the condemning authority or for 
which it was transferred to the current titleholder; and 
2. The owner from whom the property was taken by eminent domain is 
given the opportunity to repurchase the property at the price that he or she 
received from the condemning authority; 
g) After public notice and competitive bidding unless otherwise provide by 
general law, if the property was owned and controlled by the condemning 
authority or a governmental entity for at least 10 years after the condemning 
authority acquired title to the property or 
In accordance with subsection (2) 
h) (2) (a) If ownership of property is conveyed to a natural person or private 
entity pursuant to paragraph (1) (a), paragraph (1) (b), paragraph (1) (c), 
paragraph (1) (d), or paragraph (1) (e), and at least 10 years have elapsed since 
the condemning authority acquired title to the property, the property may 
subsequently be transferred, after public notice and competitive bidding, unless 
otherwise provided by general law, to another natural person or private entity 
without restriction. 
(b)  If ownership of property is conveyed to a natural person or private entity 
pursuant to paragraph (1) (a), paragraph (1) (b), paragraph (1) (c), paragraph (1) 
(d), or paragraph (1) (e), and less than 10 years have elapsed since the 
condemning authority acquired title to the property, the property may be 
transferred, after public notice and competitive bidding unless otherwise 
provided by general law, to another natural person or private entity without 
restriction, if the following conditions are met: 
1)The current titleholder documents that the property is no longer needed 
for the use or purpose for which the property was transferred to the 
current titleholder; and 
2)The owner from whom the property was taken by eminent domain is 
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governments to utilizing the taking power of eminent domain to 
traditionally public use purposes such as roads, utilities, or government 
infrastructure.
144
  However, the exceptions do not explicitly affect the 
government‟s eminent domain powers provided under section 358.81(2)(j), 
Florida Statutes, governing railroads and other public utilities.
145
 
On the other hand, section 73.014 prohibits taking private property to 
prevent or eliminate public nuisance, slum, or blight conditions
146
 by 
specifically stating that nuisance, slum, and blight conditions do not satisfy 
the public purpose standard and may not be used by a condemning 
authority as a basis for eminent domain.
147
  However,  the statute that 
provides power to counties or municipalities to adopt or enforce county or 
municipal ordinances related to code enforcement for the elimination of 
public nuisance has not been diminished to the extent such ordinances do 
 
given the opportunity to repurchase the property at the price that he or she 
received from the condemning authority. 
3)This section does not affect the limitation on a government entity‟s 
power of eminent domain contained in s. 350.81 (2)(j). 
4)The power of eminent domain shall be restricted as provided in this 
chapter and chapters 127, 163, and 166, except when the owner of a 
property relinquishes the property and concedes to the taking of the 
property in order to retain the ability to reinvest the proceeds of the sale of 
the property in replacement property under s. 1033 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  These exceptions ensure that eminent domain is still 
available for certain specified uses that the legislature has determined to 
be of such importance that eminent domain proceedings can be 
considered.) 
 144. FLA. STAT. § 70.013. 
 145. Id. 
 146. FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (prohibiting the taking of property to eliminate nuisance, slum 
or blight conditions). 
 147. 2006-11 Fla. Laws 3-4 (stating at F.S. § 73.014(1) that “[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law, including any charter provision, ordinance, statute, or special law, the 
state, any political subdivision as defined in s. 1.01(8), or any other entity to which the 
power of eminent domain is delegated may not exercise the power of eminent domain to 
take private property for the purpose of abating or eliminating a public nuisance.  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter provision, ordinance, 
statute, or special law, abating or eliminating a public nuisance is not a valid public purpose 
or use for which private property may be taken by eminent domain and does not satisfy the 
public purpose requirement of s. 6(a), Art. X of the State Constitution.  This subsection does 
not diminish the power of counties or municipalities to adopt or enforce county or municipal 
ordinances related to code enforcement or the elimination of public nuisances to the extent 
such ordinances do not authorize the taking of private property by eminent domain.”)  This 
statute appears to make it so that nuisance, blight or slum cannot be the express purposes of 
taking a property.  but I question whether or not this is so if the condemning authority finds 
some other public purpose to go along with the nuisance, blight or slum conditions to justify 
a taking. 
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not authorize the taking of property through eminent domain.
148
  The new 
sections, along with statutory notice provisions, combine to ostensibly 
provide more property owners with additional protection from transfers of 
private property to entities, and have eliminated some of the fears that 
citizens held post Kelo lest the statutory revisions be deemed insufficient. 
Florida legislators further created a political and substantive 
safeguard.  In addition to statutory revisions, the State House of 
Representatives proposed Constitutional Amendment Eight, which 
prohibited private property taken by eminent domain from being 
transferred to a person or private entity except with a three-fifths vote of 
the Legislature.
149
  The voters made their voices heard when sixty-nine 
percent of voters approved the Amendment in the November 2006 
election.
150
  This amendment changed article X, section 6, of the Florida 
Constitution by adding subsection (c) as follows: 
(c)  Private property taken by eminent domain pursuant to a 
petition to initiate condemnation proceedings filed on or after 
January 2, 2007, may not be conveyed to a natural person or 
private entity except as provided by general law passed by a 
three-fifths vote of the membership of each house of the 
Legislature.
151
 
Reading the eminent domain statutes and amended Florida 
Constitution together, there are two requirements which must be met before 
property taken by eminent domain can be conveyed to a private citizen or 
 
 148. NAT‟L ASS‟N OF INDUS. AND OFFICE PROPS. (NAIOP), EMINENT DOMAIN UPDATE 5 
(Sept. 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.naiop.org/governmentaffairs/issues/resources/eminentdomainupdate091806.pdf.  
NAIOP is the nation‟s leading trade association for developers, owners, investors, asset 
managers and other professionals in industrial, office and mixed-use commercial real estate.  
Id.  Founded in 1967, NAIOP comprises 13,000+ members in 50 North American chapters.  
See also Paul D. Bain, 1999 amendments to Florida’s Eminent Domain Statutes, 73 FLA. 
BAR J. 68 (1999), available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/76d28aa8f2ee03e185256aa9005d8
d9a/1a5bcd7ceb307ec285256adb005d62a6?OpenDocument (discussing the Florida 
legislature‟s intent to impact litigation in eminent domain with the 1999 amendments). 
 149. H.R.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006). 
 150. Weimar, supra note 125. 
 151. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6. 
(a)  No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full 
compensation therefore paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry 
of the court and available to the owner. 
(b)  Provision may be made by law for the taking of easements, by like 
proceedings, for the drainage of the land of one person over or through the land 
of another. 
Id. 
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entity.  First, ten years must pass from when the taking occurs,
152
 and 
second, three-fifths of both legislative houses must approve the transfer.
153
  
The requirement of this three-fifths vote is more symbolic than it is a real 
obstacle to preventing elected officials from taking private property via 
eminent domain and handing it over to private developers.
154
  As Professor 
Dana stated, “[o]nly Florida has opted for the across-the-board approach 
that Justice Thomas advocated for in his Kelo dissent, and in so doing, 
Florida has out-done even the proposals of ideologically charged property 
rights advocacy groups such as the Castle Coalition.”
155
 
Is this the proverbial “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” or a 
well thought-out, empirical statute with which to uphold the rights of the 
people?  Is this a protective law against the tyranny of government or a big 
corporate political smoke screen?  Has the law been revised in such a way 
as to destroy its own objective?  By analogy, one way to prevent auto 
accidents is to flatly ban driving.  Few would argue that this would not 
eliminate auto accidents, however, the question would be, at what social 
cost?  That is the question presented by the Florida Legislation—sure, it 
will protect homeowners from having their property taken for use by 
private developers, but at what social cost?  Where is the cost benefit 
analysis?  Should this be handled on a case by case basis and without the 
burdensome process of additional legislative action?  As we will see in the 
next section, the restraints Florida adopted can cripple desperate 
government entities in their quest to revitalize their communities. 
V. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: IMPACT OF FLORIDA‟S REACTION TO 
KELO 
In the rush to enact laws narrowing the allowable purposes for 
eminent domain proceedings, Florida‟s lawmakers may have overlooked 
the negative impact on counties, towns, and municipalities which rely on 
lawful takings to modernize their urban areas, attract financing and 
industries, and increase tax bases.  Florida‟s all out ban on both economic 
and blight condemnation was a hasty legislative reaction to Kelo.
156
  The 
statutory amendments cured the pernicious act of governmental takings of 
 
 152. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(2)(a) (2006). 
 153. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c). 
 154. Id.  Three-fifths is the equivalent of sixty percent as opposed to fifty percent.  Id. 
 155. Dana, supra note 62, at 375−76.  The Castle Coalition is a grassroots organization 
founded in March 2002 as a project of the Institute for Justice (IJ), a public-interest law firm 
in Washington, D.C.  CASTLE COALITION, http://www.castlecoalition.org (last visited Jan. 
30, 2011).  The organization helps teach business owners and homeowners how to fight 
eminent domain cases.  Id. 
 156. See FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2006) (“[t]aking property to eliminate nuisance, slum or 
blight conditions prohibited”). 
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private property from one citizen and conveying it to another who promises 
to make “better use” of the property.  While laudable on its face, this flat 
prohibition eliminates a legitimate tool of municipalities to better serve all 
residents, albeit at the expense of a few affected homeowners.  In this 
regard, the result is similar to takings for the public good that 
inconvenience private property owners for traditional purposes such as 
schools, libraries, railroads, roads, utility easements, and so forth.
157
  The 
legislature needs to balance the ability of counties and municipalities to 
attract new developments and overcome blight, while retaining appropriate 
safeguards to protect against abuse.
158
 
Prior to Kelo, local redevelopment efforts in Florida were governed by 
and should have been aligned with the Community Redevelopment Act of 
1969, codified under Chapter 163, Part III, Florida Statutes.
159
  When the 
Florida Legislature adopted the Act, it stated its intent as follows: 
[T]here exist in counties and municipalities of the state slum and 
blighted areas which constitute a serious and growing menace, 
injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of the 
residents of the state; that the existence of such areas . . . 
constitutes an economic and social liability imposing onerous 
burdens which decrease the tax base and reduce tax revenues, 
substantially impairs or arrests sound growth . . . aggravates 
traffic problems, and substantially hampers the elimination of 
traffic hazards and the improvement of traffic facilities; and that 
the prevention and elimination of slums and blight is a matter of 
state policy and state concern . . . . 
160
 
The Act permitted economic development by public entities in order 
to eliminate or prevent “slums” or “blight.”
161
  Each local government 
(county or municipality) could establish a Community Redevelopment 
Agency (“CRA”) to exercise the community redevelopment authority after 
a “finding of necessity,”
162
 and a further finding of the “need for a CRA to 
 
 157. See SPRINGER, 119, at 9 (advising that “broad prohibitions” on eminent domain 
“could preclude communities from revitalizing, creating jobs, and condemning blighted 
properties”). 
 158. See Romy Varghese, Harrisburg Seeks ‘Least Worst’ Path, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 
2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471204575210102200492256.html 
(illustrating the struggles of municipalities attempting to restructure under the bankruptcy 
code). 
 159. See Community Redevelopment Act of 1969, FLA. STAT. §§ 163.330-163.463 
(2006) (providing for community redevelopment agencies to minimize slums and blight). 
 160. FLA. STAT. § 163.335(1) (2006). 
 161. FLA. STAT. § 163.340 (2006). 
 162. FLA. STAT. § 163.355 (2006). 
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carry out community redevelopment.”
163
  The condition in targeted areas 
must be either a “slum”
164
 or “blight”
165
 in order for local government to 
 
 163. FLA. H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 1583, COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT 2 (2006), 
available at 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/SEctions/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1583a.LG
C.doc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1583&Session=2006; see also FLA. STAT. § 
163.370(2)(c) (2006) (giving counties and municipalities the necessary powers “to 
undertake and carry out community development and related activities”). 
 164. FLA. STAT. § 163.340(7) (2006) (“„Slum area‟ means an area having physical or 
economic conditions conducive to disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, poverty, 
or crime because there is a predominance of buildings or improvements, whether residential 
or nonresidential, which are impaired by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age, or 
obsolescence, and exhibiting one or more of the following factors:  
(a)  Inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or open spaces;  
(b)  High density of population, compared to the population density of adjacent 
areas within the county or municipality; and overcrowding, as indicated by 
government-maintained statistics or other studies and the requirements of the 
Florida Building Code; or  
(c) The existence of conditions that endanger life or property by fire or other 
causes”). 
 165. FLA. STAT. § 163.340(8) (2006) (“„Blighted area‟ means an area in which there are 
a substantial number of deteriorated, or deteriorating structures, in which conditions, as 
indicated by government-maintained statistics or other studies, are leading to economic 
distress or endanger life or property, and in which two or more of the factors are present: 
(a) Predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, parking facilities, 
roadways, bridge, or public transportation facilities; 
(b) Aggregate assessed values of real property in the area of ad valorem tax 
purposes have failed to show any appreciable increase over the 5 years prior to 
the finding of such conditions; 
(c) Faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness; 
(d) unsanitary or unsafe conditions; 
(e) Deterioration of site or other improvements; 
(f) Inadequate and outdated building density patterns; 
(g) Falling lease rates per square foot of office, commercial, or industrial space 
compared to the remainder of the county or municipality; 
(h) Tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land; 
(i) Residential and commercial vacancy rates higher in the area than in the 
remainder of the county or municipality; 
(j) Incidence of crime in the area higher than in the remainder of the county or 
municipality; 
(k) Fire and emergency medical service calls to the area proportionately higher 
than in the remainder of the county or municipality; 
(l) A greater number of violations of the Florida Building Code in the area than 
the number of violations recorded in the remainder of the county or 
municipality; 
(m) Diversity of ownership or defective or unusual conditions of title which 
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exercise the power of eminent domain. 
The CRA executed the community redevelopment plan proposed by a 
county‟s or municipality‟s governing body, which sometimes consisted of 
only five members.
166
  The redevelopment plan must have been in harmony 
with the local government‟s comprehensive plan before the municipality 
could adopt and follow it.
167
  Once the redevelopment plan was adopted, 
the counties, municipalities, and redevelopment agencies had the power of 
eminent domain to effectuate the purpose of the CRA.
168
  Therefore, local 
governments could have “acquire[d] by condemnation any interest in real 
property, including a fee simple title thereto, which it deem[ed] necessary 
for, or in connection with, community redevelopment and related activities 
under this part.”
169
  Under section 163.340(8), Florida Statutes, an area can 
be considered blighted, and subject to condemnation and private 
redevelopment, if it meets only two of the fourteen criteria.
170
 
Post-Kelo statutes, with their new bright-line rules and limited 
exceptions, drastically reduce local governments‟ flexibility in meeting the 
goals of the Community Redevelopment Act.
171
  The Community 
Redevelopment Act was amended to remove the power of eminent domain 
 
prevent the free alienability of land within the deteriorated or hazardous area; or 
(n) Governmentally owned property with adverse environmental conditions 
caused by a public or private entity. However the term “blighted area” also 
means any area in which at least one of the factors identified in paragraphs (a) 
through (n) are present and all taxing authorities subject to s. 163.387 (2) (a) 
agree, either by interlocal agreement or agreements with the agency or by 
resolution, that the area is blighted.  Such agreement or resolution shall only 
determine that the area is blighted.  For purposes of qualifying for the tax 
credits authorized in chapter 220, “blighted area” means an area as defined in 
this subsection”). 
 166. See FLA. STAT. § 163.356 (2006) (resolving that the board of a CRA shall have no 
fewer than five and no more than nine members). 
 167. See generally FLA. STAT.  §§ 163.3167, .3184, .3187, .3189, .3191, .3194 (2006) 
(describing the guidelines and procedures for adopting, amending, and evaluating 
comprehensive plans). 
 168. See FLA. STAT. § 163.375 (1999) (repealed 2006) (defining the exercise of the 
power of eminent domain). 
 169. FLA. STAT. § 163.375(1)−(3);  see generally FLA. STAT. §§ 163.358 (2006) (defining 
powers of local governments in effecting community redevelopment and related activities), 
§ 73-74 (West Supp. 2009) (describing eminent domain and proceedings supplemental to 
eminent domain), § 127.01-.02 (2000) (limiting the rights of counties to exercise eminent 
domain). 
 170. See FLA. STAT. § 163.340(8) (2006) (defining “blighted area” by listing factors such 
as “inadequate and outdated building density patterns,” a “predominance of defective or 
inadequate street layout,” an “incidence of crime in the area higher than in the remainder of 
the county or municipality,” and falling lease rates per square foot of office, commercial, or 
industrial space compared to the remainder of the county or municipality). 
 171. FLA. STAT. § 163.370 (2006) (deleting authority to delegate the power of eminent 
domain to a community redevelopment agency). 
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from the community redevelopment agencies.
172
  However, governments 
can still transfer condemned land to a natural person or private entity, but 
only after holding the property for a period of “at least ten years [after] . . . 
acquir[ing] title.”
173
  Most significantly, the new law makes it clear that 
local governments may only utilize the taking power in the context of uses 
which have been held to be traditionally valid public purposes in prior 
exercises of eminent domain or takings.  The amendments to Chapter 73 
expressly state that the “[taking of] private property for . . . eliminating a 
public nuisance. . . . slum, or blight condition[] . . . does not satisfy the 
public-purpose requirement of s[ection] 6(a), Art. X of the State 
Constitution.”
174
 
As explained above, prior to Kelo, Florida law simply required that 
there be a valid public purpose in order to exercise eminent domain over 
private property.  The 2006 amended legislation added a specific exclusion 
for slum eradication as a basis for condemning property through eminent 
domain, and further added safeguards to prevent municipalities from using 
eminent domain to take property and transfer it to private developers for 
economic improvements
175
 or blight remediation.
176
 
The purpose of governmental regulation may be to correct a problem.  
However, legislative bodies often fail to consider the law of unintended 
consequences, which is the principle that for every law or policy that is 
implemented with a set of objectives or goals in mind, there are always one 
or more unintended consequences that will stem from that law or policy.
177
  
 
 172. See FLA. STAT. § 163.358(6) (2006) (reserving the power of eminent domain to the 
governing body of the county or municipality); see also H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg. § 9 (Fla. 
2006) (amending § 163.368). 
 173. FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (West Supp. 2009); see also H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg. (Fla. 2006) 
(amending Florida state codes regarding eminent domain); H.R.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg. 
(Fla. 2006) (amending the Florida State Constitution prohibiting transfer of property taken 
by eminent domain to a natural person or private entity, with exceptions to be enacted by 
legislature). 
 174. H.B. 1567 § 1, 2006 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Fla. 2006); see also David Parkhurst, Senate 
Passes Eminent Domain Amendment, NAT‟L LEAGUE OF CITIES (Oct. 24, 2005), 
http://www.nlc.org/Newsroom/Nation_s_Cities_Weekly_v2/Weekly_NCW/2005_v2/10_v3
/24_v6/6787.aspx (reporting in 2006 that the U.S. Senate adopted an amendment to an 
appropriation bill permitting states and cities to use federal funds for projects using eminent 
domain for a public use). 
 175. See FLA. STAT. § 163.335(7) (2006). 
 176. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 73.014(2) (West Supp. 2009) (prohibiting the taking of 
private property “for the purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or blight conditions” and 
thus acknowledging that slum and blight are no longer recognized as valid public purposes 
for the taking of private property in Florida). 
 177. See Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html (last visited 
February 3, 2011) (providing a definition and discussion of the concept of “unintended 
consequences”); see also Richard J. Grant, Government Interference Led to Financial 
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While the Florida Legislature quickly enacted laws to correct a perceived 
problem, namely Kelo-type takings, it neglected to consider that its 
legislation could have side effects that overshadow the benefits.
178
 
A. Impact on Credit Markets and Financing 
One such side effect, for example, is the possible impact on a local 
government‟s ability to attract or maintain standing in the credit markets.  
Limiting eminent domain powers may have negative credit implications for 
local government.
179
  A special report released by Fitch Ratings
180
 
expressed concerns that “if eminent domain powers are restricted to a 
significant degree, municipal credit quality could be restrained or 
negatively affected. . . .  By impairing a state or local government‟s efforts 
towards economic development, such legislation, if enacted, may limit 
opportunities for credit quality improvement and rating upgrades.”
181
  The 
report further indicates, “restrictive legislation has the potential to 
contribute to a diminution of credit quality over a longer term, in that, the 
proposed laws limit a state or local government‟s ability to respond to 
economic blight or weakened conditions.”
182
  Specifically, “the impact of 
restrictive legislation mostly will affect development-reliant credit types, 
such as tax allocation bonds, special assessment debt and [structured] 
obligations . . . , and, [in the long run,] impact both development-related 
debt and broader-based securities issued by the municipality, such as 
 
Crisis, RICHARDJGRANT.COM BLOG, Jan. 10, 2010, 3:28 PM, 
http://richardgrant.blogspot.com/2010/01/government-interference-led-to.html (“A 
government regulatory action that directly contributed to the recent financial crisis was the 
Community Reinvestment Act.  This act created an arbitrary, race-based standard for 
judging banks‟ lending practices.  As a result, banks could be sued for discrimination if they 
did not lend to minorities in numbers that the regulatory authorities determined to be 
sufficient. . . .  [The lowering of bank lending standards led to the growth of the subprime 
market,] as did the risk for default.”). 
 178. See generally Grant, supra note 177 (describing various instances of government 
financial regulations producing unintended consequences). 
 179. Fitch: Eminent Domain Restrictions Affect on Muni Credit Quality, THE FREE 
LIBRARY BY FARLEX, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Fitch%3a+Eminent+Domain+Restrictions+Affect+on+Muni
+Credit+Quality.-a0142626776 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
 180. Fitch Ratings is a leading global credit rating agency committed to providing the 
world‟s credit markets with independent, timely and prospective credit opinions.  Built on a 
foundation of organic growth and strategic acquisitions, Fitch Ratings has grown rapidly 
during the past decade gaining market presence throughout the world and across all fixed 
income markets.  See Overview, FITCH RATINGS, 
http://www.fitchratings.com/jsp/creditdesk/AboutFitch.faces?context=1&detail=1 (last 
visited February 15, 2011). 
 181. Fitch: Eminent Domain Restrictions Affect on Muni Credit Quality, supra note 179. 
 182. Id. 
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general obligation bonds, lease obligations, and utility revenue bonds.”
183
 
From an economic standpoint, local government is faced with many 
decisions on how to best meet the economic environment of its citizens and 
the community.  Prior to Kelo, a CRA could declare an area or a 
neighborhood to be slum or blighted and exercise the power of eminent 
domain to clear the property.
184
  The seized property would be marshaled 
into an economically advantageous tract and offered to a private developer 
to redevelop in accordance with a CRA adopted redevelopment plan.
185
  
The private developer was rewarded by gaining the value of the increased 
tax base as security for a municipal bond, which would underwrite the 
infrastructure cost of a new private development and by obtaining an 
assembled tract at a price below what it would have cost as individual 
parcels.
186
  Under the CRA, it was foreseeable that a developer would not 
need to invest in the infrastructure because these costs may already have 
been paid for by bond funds procured by the area‟s projected increase in 
taxable value.
187
 
States, counties, and municipalities may issue municipal bonds to 
finance the necessary infrastructure to develop or redevelop localities and 
to finance general public-purpose projects such as roads, bridges, utilities, 
and airports.
188
  As a result, the cost will be spread over a fixed period of 
years until the bonds mature and the costs are shared by all those who 
benefit from the development or redevelopment of the project.
189
  
Therefore, haste on the part of Florida lawmakers in enacting legislation to 
correct one problem—the prevention of Kelo-type takings—may have 
created unintended consequences that increase the economic cost for 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. FLA STAT. § 163.340(8) (2006). 
 185. S. William Moore, “Blight” as a Means of Justifying Condemnation for Economic 
Redevelopment in Florida, 35 STETSON L. REV. 443, 444-45 (2006). 
 186. Id. at 445. 
 187. See generally id. at 446, 451, 457.  In Tax Increment Financing (“TIF”), when the 
property tax value in the redevelopment area rises above property values in the base year the 
redevelopment area was created, increment revenues are generated by applying the current 
millage rate levied by taxing authority in the area to the increase in value.  That increase 
value or increment revenue is deposited in a CRA trust fund.   These revenues are used to 
service bonds issued to finance redevelopment project.  Instead of taking the blighted 
property through eminent domain, this is another method of funding used for redeveloping 
blighted areas under the CRA.  However, CRAs are not typically overseen by the state since 
all the monies used in financing CRA activities are locally generated.  See also FLA. 
REDEVELOPMENT ASS‟N (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.redevelopment.net/crafq.aspx (FRA is 
a non-profit organization assisting those in Florida revitalization efforts). 
 188. See also TALBOT D‟ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE 109-11 (1991) (commenting on art. VII, §§ 10 and 11 of the Florida Constitution 
regarding proper uses for proceeds from extension of government credit). 
 189. Id. 
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private developers redeveloping blighted communities.  For example, in 
light of our economic crisis, the market price for municipal bonds may vary 
with the changes in interest rates.  An increase in the interest rate may lead 
to lower bond prices, and the bonds may be at risk if they are not held to 
maturity.
190
  This may discourage potential bond purchasers due to fear of 
loss or failure to pay back the money borrowed.
191
  Similarly, the private 
developers may not get the benefit of the municipal bond to underwrite the 
cost of the infrastructure and funding redevelopment plans.
192
 
B. Impact on Legitimate Efforts to Eradicate Blight 
In addition, did the Legislature consider the cost to local government 
of resorting to alternative means to clean up or eliminate blighted areas?  
Since the Act‟s “blighted area” test was eliminated as a basis for local 
governments to take private property through eminent domain,
193
 blight 
condemnation is no longer considered a valid public purpose or use for 
which property may be taken.
194
  Municipalities and counties now have to 
resort to adopting or enforcing local ordinances related to code 
enforcement for the elimination of public nuisance, provided the ordinance 
does not authorize the taking of private property by eminent domain.
195
  
This can lead to increased expenses due to enforcement action and may 
never result in a permanent solution if the property owner is simply unable 
to afford eliminating the condition. 
With the implementation of Chapter 73, “local government will no 
longer be able to delegate their condemnation powers to community 
redevelopment agencies, and CRAs will only be able to acquire property 
for redevelopment through voluntary methods.”
196
  Therefore, property 
 
 190. Fitch: Eminent Domain Restrictions Affect on Muni Credit Quality, supra note 182. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Moore, supra note 185, at 452. 
 193. See Mark Bentley, Hurricane Kelo Hits Florida, FLORIDAEMINENTDOMAIN.COM, 
http://www.floridaeminentdomain.com/images/Article-Hurricane_Kelo_Hits_Florida.pdf 
(2007) (describing amendment of Florida statutes to remove blight as an acceptable reason 
for public takings); see also FLA. STAT. §73.014 (stating that the power of eminent domain 
may not be exercised to take private property for the purpose of abating or eliminating a 
public nuisance). 
 194. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a). 
 195. FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2006). 
 196. Mark Riso & Mandy Hagan, Eminent Domain Update, NAT‟L. ASS‟N. INDUS. & 
OFFICE PROPS., at 5 (Sept. 16, 2006), 
http://www.naiop.org/governmentaffairs/issues/resources/eminentdomainupdate091806.pdf.  
NAIOP is the nation‟s leading trade association for developers, owners, investors, asset 
managers and other professionals in industrial, office and mixed-use commercial real estate.  
Founded in 1967, NAIOP comprises over 13,000 members in fifty North American 
chapters.  Id.; see also Paul D. Bain, 1999 Amendments to Florida’s Eminent Domain 
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acquired by the CRA is now subject to a ten-year holding period, during 
which time the transfer of the property to a natural person or private entity 
is prohibited.
197
  The impact of this timetable, especially as it relates to 
holding cost and opportunity cost, is that cities may miss out on an 
opportunity to attract new business ventures that are ready, willing, and 
able to begin construction.  Only under certain limited conditions, and after 
public notice and competitive bidding, may condemned property be 
transferred before the statutory ten years have elapsed, without 
restrictions.
198
  If a city takes property by eminent domain and immediately 
transfers it to a private party, the city may collect revenue during the ten 
years it would otherwise be required to “hold” the taken property, which 
could, depending on the property, be a significant amount of revenue.  How 
much opportunity cost does the waiting period create?  The chance to 
redevelop at a lower-than-normal cost may be lost while waiting for the 
mandated time period to elapse. 
In addition to the ten-year waiting period, local governments must 
address article X, § 6(c), which prohibits the transfer of ownership or 
control of private property taken by eminent domain to any natural person 
or private entity unless authorized by general law passed by three-fifths 
vote of each house of the Legislature.
199
  This requirement will result in 
significant additional cost to the political subdivision in the form of 
attorneys‟ fees, lobbying expenses, and time, as the House and Senate meet 
for only a sixty-day period each year.  In difficult economic times, and 
dealing with the declining tax bases that always accompany blighted areas, 
the combined restrictions impose what may amount to an unreasonable 
 
Statutes, 73 FLA. BAR J. 10, 68 (1999) available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/76d28aa8f2ee03e185256aa9005d8
d9a/1a5bcd7ceb307ec285256adb005d62a6?OpenDocument (stating that new amendments 
to Florida‟s eminent domain laws require pre-suit negotiations in eminent domain 
litigations). 
 197. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(1)(f) (2006). 
 198. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(2)(b) (2006). 
If ownership of property is conveyed to a natural person or private entity . . . 
and less than 10 years have elapsed since the condemning authority acquired 
title to the property, the property may be transferred, after public notice and 
competitive bidding unless otherwise provided by general law, to another 
natural person or private entity without restriction, if the following conditions 
are met: 1. The current titleholder documents that the property is no longer 
needed for the use or purpose for which the property was transferred to the 
current titleholder; and 2. The owner from whom the property was taken by 
eminent domain is given the opportunity to repurchase the property at the price 
that he or she received from the condemning authority. 
Id. 
 199. FLA. CONST. art.  X, § 6(c). 
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burden on local governments faced with troubled communities.
200
 
VI. BRINGING IN THE SHEEP: A SOLUTION FOR GROWN AND 
REDEVELOPMENT 
The author‟s concern is not with Florida‟s critical evaluation of each 
economic proposal, but with the summary fashion by which this 
Legislation mandates rejection of all proposals involving private 
development or use.  Indeed, under this legislation, property previously 
condemned and taken by the state could not be transferred to a private 
citizen for economic development, even if the city has vacated the property, 
unless the Legislature authorizes a general law passed by three-fifths vote 
of each house.  Needless to say, obtaining such approval from the 
Legislature could delay projects to the point of dissuading developers from 
pursuing them.  The key is to balance the needs of local communities with 
the desire to uphold private property rights.  Partnerships between local 
governments and private developers have proven to be the most successful 
method of redevelopment.
201
  Therefore, I recommend that sections 73.013 
and 73.014, Florida Statutes, and article X, § 6(c) of the Florida 
Constitution, be amended to address the unintended consequences created 
by the Legislature in attempting to rectify the effects of Kelo.  The problem 
created by the restrictive legislation could destroy the ability of 
municipalities to attract new industry and generate revenue. 
The first step that Florida‟s lawmakers should take is to amend the 
eminent domain statute to allow partnerships between local government 
and private developers.  The legislative response to Kelo was a craven 
political reaction designed to quell constituent concerns rather than a 
reasoned practical solution that serves the best interest of Floridians.  The 
term “public purpose” has as many definitions as “affirmative action.”  Just 
as affirmative action is viewed by some as code for quotas and hiring of 
incompetents to fulfill quotas, post-Kelo public purpose is viewed as a code 
for the government taking the property of one private citizen to give to 
another private party who promises to make better use of the property.  In 
both cases, the concerns are unfounded mischaracterizations of the terms.  
Yet politicians know that voters cast their ballots based on their perceptions 
of the information even if their perceptions are inaccurate or misleading.  
Sections 73.013 and 73.014, Florida Statutes, are overly restrictive, as is 
article X, section 6(c) of the Florida Constitution.  An analysis of the facts 
 
 200. See FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (2006) (creating additional hurdles for local governments 
in the transfer of properties acquired under eminent domain). 
 201. Francesca Jarosz, Before You Grab That Property . . . States Take A Close Look at 
Eminent Domain, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2007, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2007-01-02/jarosz.shtml. 
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in Kelo shows that the property in question was first condemned because it 
was viewed as a depressed municipality.  This part of the decision is 
generally not in dispute.  Indeed, if the designation of the property as 
depressed was an error, the Court would have sustained the finding or 
remanded for a redetermination.  The critical issue in Kelo is whether the 
condemning authority was authorized to turn the property over to private 
developers.
202
 
To ensure that struggling local governments have all the tools they 
need to fight economic decline in their communities, I propose to repeal the 
blanket restriction on transferring property taken by eminent domain to 
private developers and to replace it with a provision that provides 
protection for the citizen if the economic benefits are not forthcoming after 
a reasonable time.  For instance, the Act should provide for returning the 
property to the state if, after five years, the projected economic benefits to 
the municipality have not occurred.  Many of the negative impacts explored 
in Section IV above can be overcome by providing local governments the 
authority to partner with private developers in implementing a plan in 
accordance with a carefully legislated CRA. 
The law should also contain provisions to prevent abuse.  I suggest 
establishing a state administrative agency of economic development with 
powers to promulgate rules, regulations, and guidelines for approving 
partnerships between local government and private developers when 
eminent domain is one of the tools employed.  Such rules and regulations 
should be adopted pursuant to the Florida Administrative Procedures Act, 
with public participation through notice and comment.  This would remove 
decisions from politicians, whose goal is re-election rather than the best 
interest of the state, and place the decision with an administrative agency 
that is somewhat insulated from political pressure. 
The solution described above offers a compromise between pre- and 
post-Kelo extremes.  It would return to local governments their most 
valuable tool for redevelopment while not encouraging overzealous takings 
in the quest to alleviate blight and ensure vibrant local communities for 
years to come. 
 
 202. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (challenging city‟s exercise 
of eminent domain power on grounds that takings were not for public use). 
